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Introduction 
In this paper I will present an alternative to the Supreme Court of India’s judgment in the case 
of Sakshi v. Union of India AIR 2004 SC 3566. The purpose of this exercise, inspired by the 
Feminist Judgments Project in the UK1 and elsewhere,2 is to implement feminist theory in 
judicial practice and to provide an alternative to the supposedly ‘universal’ voice of judicial 
authority. Alternative judgments, in this case feminist judgments, have the potential to 
destabilise the claims of universality and neutrality in judicial decision-making and expose the 
underlying inevitable positionality of the decision-makers and their political leanings.3 I have 
chosen this particular judgment because its inadequacies affect women’s lives profoundly in 
relation to sexual violence, for reasons I will discuss later.  
The original case was a writ petition submitted to the Supreme Court of India in its 
original civil jurisdiction under Article 32 of the Constitution of India. Article 32 empowers any 
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person or group of persons within the jurisdiction of the Constitution, to move the Supreme 
Court for the enforcement of her/his Fundamental Rights.4 The Fundamental Rights too are 
listed in the Constitution.5 The fundamental rights that the petitioner was seeking to enforce 
through this petition were the right to equality contained in Articles 14 and 15 and the right to 
life contained in Article 21 of the Constitution.6 The petition was a Public Interest Litigation 
(henceforth PIL), that is, it was brought by a party on behalf of a group of persons even though 
the party is not a part of the group.7 In the next sections I will summarise the facts of the case 
and the Supreme Court’s original decision before writing my feminist version of the judgment.  
Overview of the original judgment in Sakshi v. Union of India  
 
Indian criminal law constructs ‘rape’ as heterosexual violence perpetrated by the insertion of a 
man’s penis into a woman’s vagina without the legitimate consent of the woman involved. The 
Indian Penal Code 1860 (henceforth IPC), which contains the rape provision, was codified and 
enacted by the colonial British government.8 It was part of the attempt to consolidate the 
power of the newly declared direct rule of India by the British government after the Indian 
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Mutiny of 1857 and to give India an overall modern legal system by codifying most of its laws.9 
The other laws that were codified in this period included the Indian Divorce Act 1869,10 the 
Indian Contract Act 1872, the Indian Evidence Act 1872, and the Guardians and Wards Act 1890. 
However, David Skuy has argued that the motivation for enacting the Indian Penal Code had 
nothing to do with the state of the contemporary Indian laws. It was more of an experiment in 
codifying the British criminal laws and implementing them –  
‘…the Code's substantive and procedural provisions were motivated by shortcomings in 
England. The Indian Penal Code represents the transplanting of English law in India, not 
because Indian law was primitive, but because English law needed reform. Once the Indian 
Penal Code is placed within its proper historical perspective, it becomes quite clear that 
India was rarely a factor in determining the Code’s form or content.’11 
The enactment of the IPC coincided with a long-drawn political debate that had been raging in 
India, especially in Bengal, since the end of the 18th century and had reached its peak at the 
later half of the 19th. The debate was between the British government and the Indian reformists 
on one side and the Indian cultural nationalists on the other side on the matter of legislative 
interventions in religious and social customs that disadvantage women.12 The image of the 
quintessential Indian woman had become a battleground for the coloniser and the colonised 
male at the time. The ideological justification of colonial rule was often based on the mission to 
civilise India and save its women from their own barbaric traditions. 
                                                          
9
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‘Alongside the project of instituting orderly, lawful and rational procedures of governance, 
colonialism also saw itself as performing a “civilizing mission.” In identifying this tradition as 
“degenerate and barbaric,” colonialist critics invariably repeated a long list of atrocities 
perpetrated on Indian women … By assuming a position of sympathy with the unfree and 
oppressed womanhood of India, the colonial mind was able to transform this figure of the 
Indian woman into a sign of the inherently oppressive and unfree nature of the entire 
cultural tradition of a country.’13  
A section of the Western-educated urban elite Hindu men of India had started to conceive of 
customs like child marriage, ascetic widowhood and sati14 as a national embarrassment and 
branded them ‘social evils’. These groups had begun organising campaigns to lobby the colonial 
government for legislative interventions and had undertaken a wider program of female 
emancipation through education.15 On the other side of the debate, the emerging cultural 
nationalists of India resisted zealously the legislative and other measures in favour of ‘female 
emancipation’ as an alien influence.16 The fundamental problem for Indian nationalists was to 
support the general modernisation of indigenous society to keep pace with Western standards, 
and at the same time to affirm a distinctive cultural identity for the nation. The nationalists 
‘resolved’ the problem by conceptually dividing the spiritual and material domains of culture as 
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autonomous spheres and analogising them to the social roles of women and men.17 Indian 
women became the repository of the inner/spiritual life of the colonised nation and had to be 
defended against the reach of the alien colonial power.18 Among a storm of passionate political 
debate, the colonial state supported by Indian reformers passed a number of legislative 
measures to rescue women from ‘oppressive’ customs – such as the prohibition of Sati in 1829, 
legalisation of widow remarriage in 1856 and raising the age of consent within marriage in 
1891.19  
The law of rape within the Indian Penal Code was enacted at this time of strong political 
friction between the cultural nationalists and the colonial state supported by Indian reformers 
over the meaning and status of the quintessential Indian womanhood. Yet the rape law does 
not seem to be predominantly shaped by the above controversy, in all probability because the 
law of rape had no particular socio-religious connotation and with its marital rape exemption 
was perfectly compatible with the nationalistic patriarchal necessities of life. The criminal laws 
including the rape law was probably seen by the nationalists as part of the laws governing 
public life, similar to the other laws mentioned before, which were implemented without much 
controversy at all. Moreover, the rape law was not so much an infringing alien norm interfering 
with an Indian man’s authority over his women (as the other laws that outlawed established 
customs were); it was rather a tool for safeguarding his women from illegitimate intrusion 
(Indian or foreign) and strengthening his title through the marital rape exemption. 
                                                          
17
 M. Sinha, ‘Reading Mother India: Empire, Nation and the Female Voice’, 6(2) Journal of Women’s History (1994) 
6-44 at 6-7 
18
 Chatterjee (1989) at 623-627 
19
 T. Sarkar, ‘A Pre-history of Rights: The Age of Consent Debate in Colonial Bengal’, Feminist Studies 26(3) (2000) 
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In the year 1997, fifty years after independence and more than one hundred and thirty 
years after the original rape laws came into force, Sakshi, a sexual violence intervention and 
victim support organisation, filed a writ petition in the Supreme Court of India arguing for 
broadening of the definition of rape by judicial interpretation to include all other kinds of 
penetrative sexual violence against women. The respondents were the Union of India, the 
Indian Central Government’s Ministry of Law and Justice and the Commissioner of Police, 
National Capital Territory of New Delhi.  
The legal provision under scrutiny here was Section 375 of the IPC – the provision that 
defines rape as the act, committed by a man, of having sexual intercourse with a woman 
without her consent and/or against her will by using force, intimidation, blackmail or deceit. 
The term ‘sexual intercourse’ has not been specifically defined by the statute, except for the 
assertion that even the slightest ‘penetration’ would amount to intercourse. ‘Penetration’ again 
has not been defined. Yet the law enforcers and judiciary have habitually adopted the definition 
of penetration of the vagina of the victim by the penis of the perpetrator. Sakshi argued that 
such a narrow interpretation of ‘sexual intercourse’ renders the provision inadequate to 
provide redress in the considerable variety of penetrative sexual violence which does not 
involve vaginal-penile penetration. It asked the Court to give the provision a broader judicial 
interpretation to safeguard the interests of the victims of these ‘other’ kinds of non-consensual 
sexual penetrations. The petition argued that such a narrow interpretation of the definition of 
rape infringes the fundamental rights of equality20 and of life with human dignity21 of women as 
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a group. The arguments of the petitioner and the respondents will be elaborated fully in the 
alternative feminist judgment later on in the paper. Here it would suffice to say that much of 
the arguments of the petitioner, in spite of their stance in support of justice for women, were 
problematic from a feminist viewpoint. The fact that I have chosen to write an alternative 
feminist judgment for this case, does not endorse the petitioner’s arguments as 
unproblematically feminist. Sakshi did not include important feminist arguments in its petition, 
for example, the essential patriarchal nature of the division between ‘real’ rapes and ‘non-real’ 
ones.22  Most significantly it conflated the issue of legal non-recognition of the harms of ‘other’ 
kinds of penetrative sexual violence with the issue of protection of girl-children from sexual 
abuse. Sakshi’s arguments frame the adverse effects of the narrow definition of rape in terms 
of legal inadequacy regarding child sexual abuse and argues that the rape law needs to 
acknowledge other kinds of rapes because the ‘modern’ times have seen an increase in the 
sexual abuse of girl-children. These two are related issues but in no sense they are the same, 
nor should they be substituted for one another. 
It is true that India has gross legal shortfalls when it comes to the criminalisation of sexual 
abuse of children. Unless child sexual abuse involves vaginal-penile rape, it is prosecuted under 
provisions of unnatural sex (which does not depend on absence of consent, and until 2009 was 
primarily meant for consensual homosexual relations)23 or the law that criminalises outraging 
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the modesty of women.24 Both these laws are inappropriate for prosecuting sexual abuse for 
reasons I will elaborate in my feminist judgment. Sakshi contended that the ‘other’ kinds of 
penetrative sexual violence that are left out of the current definition of rape are primarily 
endured by girl-children.25 This is not a proven fact, nor is this the primary reason why the 
definition of rape needs expansion.  
Sakshi also submitted that Article 15(3) of the Constitution of India stipulates that the 
state can make special provisions in favour of women and children, under which power Section 
376(2)(f) IPC has been enacted which stipulates an aggravated penalty for the rape of girl-
children below the age of 12. According to Sakshi, the special provisions that the state is 
empowered to make must be adequate to serve the purpose, but the narrow definition of rape 
renders Section 376(2)(f) ineffective in cases of child abuse involving other kids of rape. It is 
again true that as long as only one kind of rape is defined as rape by the law, child abuse 
involving other kinds of rape will fall through the cracks of law. But it is the same for sexual 
violence against adult women. Therefore this argument of Sakshi again somehow usurped the 
focus of the legal point from the need to acknowledge the sexual harms of all women to the 
need to protect girl-children. Sakshi’s move here to focus its arguments on the plight of the girl-
child had grave consequences for the outcome of the case – the judgment dealt at length with 
the issue of treatment of child victims of sexual violence in the criminal justice system. In my 
view, if the petition had not diluted the issue of whether women in general have the right to 
have their sexual harms acknowledged by the criminal law by concentrating disproportionately 
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on the issue of child abuse, the Court might not have found the easy way out. By easy way, I 
mean the way of making provisions in favour of protection of girl-children, often preferred by 
patriarchal institutions to make up their liberal credentials, than to make provisions that 
safeguard the sexual rights of women. Another example of such preference for the easy way is 
the 172nd Report of the Law Commission of India which advises against the deletion of the 
marital rape exemption on privacy grounds,26 but instead proposes that the protection from 
marital rape that is available to girl-children below the age of fifteen should be extended to 
children until the age of sixteen. It is again preferred by the Commission to extend its 
benevolence of ‘protection’ to women under the age of sixteen rather than to acknowledge the 
right of all women to be free from sexual violence in a marital relationship irrespective of their 
age. And this preference in all probability is due to the fact that protecting a female child from 
sexual violence, because she is not ready in mind and body, does not challenge the patriarchal 
ideas of male property in women’s sexuality the way recognising the independent sexual rights 
of adult women does.  
Here I would like to clarify that I do not disagree with the fact that absence of appropriate 
criminal laws addressing child sexual abuse is a serious issue and that laws should be enacted 
and implemented to address it sufficiently. Yet, in spite of its seriousness, it cannot usurp the 
other significant issue of whether the law acknowledges and upholds the sexual rights of 
women irrespective of their age. In the absence of sincere attention to the latter, a 
disproportionate focus on the former will only serve to hide the deeper inadequacies of law 
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excessive interference with the marital relationship’ – 172
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and mystify the actual reasons why laws dealing with child abuse have still not materialised six 
decades after independence.  
After long drawn deliberation, the Court decided in 2004 that judicially broadening the 
scope of the said provision is not appropriate and instead urged the Indian legislature to make 
laws to specifically deal with child abuse.27 I will summarise here the key points of the Supreme 
Court’s judgment delivered on 26th May 2004. 
The Court referred to the ‘well settled principle’ of not reading words into the statute but 
gathering the legislative intent from a plain reading of the words used. It was held to be all the 
more ‘wrong and dangerous’ to substitute the words of a statute with other words if the 
statute concerned is a penal one.28 It was not made clear what wrongs the broadened 
definition of rape would cause and on whom the potential dangers would lie. The Court then 
went on to mention that the provisions under scrutiny have come up on numerous occasions 
before different courts in India at different points of time but a broadened definition of ‘rape’ 
has never been considered or accepted. The court also expressed its concern that widening the 
definition of rape would contravene the constitutional right of the accused under Article 20(1) 
of the Indian Constitution, which guarantees that no person will be punished for a crime that 
did not exist at the time of its commission, i.e. an act that was not designated as a crime at the 
time of its commission.29 The court agreed with the Respondents that the broad definition of 
rape as laid down by the International Criminal Tribunal for former Yugoslavia (henceforth 
                                                          
27
 Sakshi v. Union of India & Ors. AIR 2004 SC 3566; 2004 Supp(2) SCR 723, para 42; I discuss this judicial focus on 
legislative measures regarding child abuse later in the paper. 
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ICTY)30 in a judgment dated 10th December 1998,31 did not apply in the present context as ‘The 
judgment is not at all concerned with interpretation of any provision of domestic law in peace 
time conditions.’32 The court did not spare any words to refute the content of the ICTY’s 
broadened definition of rape or to justify how and why the domestic ‘peace time’ notion of 
rape in India needs to be different from the international ‘war time’ notion favoured by the 
ICTY.  
As for the petitioner’s claim of giving a broader interpretation to the definition of 
‘penetration’ in Section 375 IPC purposively, to bring all forms of penetrative sexual violence 
within its ambit, the court concluded that such an exercise in the absence of any ambiguities in 
the definition of rape would be against the interest of society at large.33 The interests of the 
larger society that the court was concerned about are summed up in the following passage 
from the judgment: 
‘It may be noted that ours is a vast and big country of over 100 crore people. Normally, the 
first reaction of a victim of crime is to report the incident at the police station and it is the 
police personnel who register a case under the appropriate Sections of the Penal Code. Such 
police personnel are invariably not highly educated people but they have studied the basic 
provisions of the Indian Penal Code and after registering the case under the appropriate 
sections, further action is taken by them as provided in Code of Criminal Procedure. Indian 
Penal Code is a part of the curriculum in the law degree and it is the existing definition of 
'rape' as contained in s 375 IPC which is taught to every student of law. A criminal case is 
initially handled by a Magistrate and thereafter such cases [which] are exclusively triable by 
                                                          
30
 Official name – International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of 
International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia since 1991 
31
 Prosecution v. Anto Furundzija, Case No IT-95-17/1-T (10
th
 Dec 1998) ICTY, para 185 – full judgment  available at 
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/furundzija/tjug/en/fur-tj981210e.pdf  
32
 Sakshi 2004, para 28 
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Court of Session are committed to the Court of Session. The entire legal fraternity of India, 
lawyers or Judges, have the definition as contained in s 375 IPC ingrained in their mind and 
the cases are decided on the said basis. The first and foremost requirement in criminal law is 
that it should be absolutely certain and clear. An exercise to alter the definition of rape, as 
contained in s 375 IPC, by a process of judicial interpretation, and that too when there is no 
ambiguity in the provisions of the enactment, is bound to result in good deal of chaos and 
confusion, and will not be in the interest of society of large.’34 
The above judicial reasoning safeguards the interests of the police personnel who are assumed 
by the court to be ‘not highly educated’, the legal fraternity who apparently are unable to 
absorb and retain new legal developments and indeed the whole population of India who again 
supposedly will be disadvantaged by the uncertainty of the law caused by the broadening of the 
legal definition of rape. In my view, this is a condescending view of the police and legal 
community of India and a distorted understanding of the interest of the society. If the women 
victims of ‘other’ kinds of penetrative sexual violence, whose harms are invalidated by the 
narrow definition of rape, are part of the larger society, then it is problematic to say that 
ensuring their harms are recognised and redressed adequately is against the interest of the 
society. To me this reasoning comes across as a way of glossing over the glaring inadequacies of 
the current rape law in relation to the redress of ‘other’ kinds of rape and of circumventing the 
truly relevant arguments in the case. The inability of the law to safeguard the fundamental 
entitlement of a woman to have her harms recognised by the legal system she lives under is not 
addressed by the court. Instead the remote interests of the ‘police personnel’, the ‘legal 
fraternity’ and the ‘wider society’ become the crux of the decision.  
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The Supreme Court next concentrated its analytical energies on the rule of stare decisis –  
‘…where a principle of law has become established by a series of decisions, it is binding on 
the courts and should be followed in similar cases. It is a wholesome doctrine which gives 
certainty to law and guides the people to mould their affairs in future’.35  
 
Further reference was made to a series of previous Supreme Court decisions, which have 
upheld this principle. It was emphasized that rules of law when ‘clearly’ laid down by a court of 
last resort must not be disregarded. So much of the court’s effort was spent analysing the 
degree of ‘clarity’ of the current definition of rape under Section 375 that none was left to 
analyse its justifiability and constitutionality. The fact that the unjustness and 
unconstitutionality of the definition was challenged by the petitioner and not its ‘clarity’ was 
conveniently overlooked. The court admitted that the rule of stare decisis does not altogether 
forbid departure from it but the rule can only be bent if its application is found to perpetuate a 
grievous wrong.36 In all other cases stare decisis must be strictly applied. It is clear then that the 
existing narrow definition of rape was not considered to be perpetuating any grievous wrong. 
The Court finally ruled that the petition must fail for the following reasons –  
‘Accepting the contention of the writ petitioner and giving a wider meaning of s 375 IPC will 
lead to a serious confusion in the minds of prosecuting agencies and the courts which 
instead of achieving the object of expeditiously bringing a criminal to book may 
unnecessarily prolong the legal proceedings and would have an adverse impact on the 
society as a whole.’37 
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At the same time the court accepted the petitioner’s claim that the absence of laws that 
adequately redress ‘other’ kinds of penetrative sexual violence affects female children most 
adversely because, as discussed earlier, apparently female children are most often raped in 
‘other’ ways. Again, I must admit that India truly and urgently needs appropriate criminal laws 
addressing the sexual abuse of children, yet the absence of such laws cannot be held to be the 
only problem with the narrow definition of rape. The current law makes an unfair and 
unconstitutional differentiation between different kinds of rapes and redresses some of them. 
As a result a considerable proportion of victims of sexual assaults are deprived of proper legal 
recourse. No amount of laws on child abuse can justify the continuance of this narrow 
definition. 
It might also seem that the Supreme Court was simply refusing to engage in judicial 
activism, insisting on sticking to its role of only implementing the existing laws and leaving the 
business of law-making to the parliament. But there are two problems with this interpretation 
of the court’s stance – firstly, the petition did not ask the court to make new law against the 
original intention of the legislature; on the contrary the petition asked the court to clarify an 
ambiguous term in the statute, and to give it an interpretation best suited to its Constitutional 
obligation of safeguarding the fundamental rights of its people. Secondly, the Indian Supreme 
Court is no stranger to judicial activism. In spite of a fair dose of attendant controversies the 
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Supreme Court has a sustained history of judicial activism.38 An ex-Supreme Court Judge writes 
–  
‘…judicial activism is an undeniable part of the judicial process in a democracy and the only 
relevant question is what should be the degree and extent of judicial activism… *The 
Supreme Court of India] has invented an impressive range of concepts in both private and 
public law…. We in India are trying to move away from formalism and to use juristic activism 
for achieving distributive justice or, as we in India are accustomed to labelling it, “social 
justice”…. Judges in India are not in an uncharted sea in the decision-making process. They 
have to justify their decision-making within the framework of constitutional values. This is 
nothing but another form of constitutionalism which is concerned with substantivization 
[sic+ of social justice. I will call this appropriately “social activism”… The modern judiciary 
cannot afford to hide behind notions of legal justice and plead incapacity when social justice 
issues are addressed to it. This challenge is an important one, not just because judges owe a 
duty to do justice with a view to creating and molding [sic] a just society, but because a 
modern judiciary can no longer obtain social and political legitimacy without making a 
substantial contribution to issues of social justice.’39 
In my view, this particular petition to broaden the definition of rape to safeguard the 
constitutional rights of women failed primarily because the woman envisaged in the relevant 
criminal law does not match the person who can claim his rights under Indian constitutional 
law; and the Court’s judgment, in its simplest purport, refused to align the construction of the 
woman in criminal law with that of the rights-holding person in constitutional law. This claim 
warrants explanation. It is clear that the woman in the criminal law is understood to be harmed 
                                                          
38
 U. Baxi, ‘Taking Suffering Seriously: Social Action Litigation in the Supreme Court of India’, Third World Legal 
Studies (1985) 107-132; S.P. Sathe, ‘Judicial Activism: The Indian Experience’, Journal of Law & Policy 6 (2001) 29-
107; M. Khosla, ‘Addressing Judicial Activism in the Indian Supreme Court: Towards an Evolved Debate’, Hastings 
International and Comparative Law Review 32 (2009) 55-100 
39
 Bhagwati (1985-1985) above at note 7 
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only if she experiences vaginal-penile rape; all other kinds of penetrative sexual violence are 
not conceptualised as equally harmful. In fact they are thought to be so much less harmful that 
they are tried under inadequate laws like those of sexual harassment (outrage of the modesty 
of a woman) and homosexuality (unnatural sex), none of which were originally enacted for the 
purpose of prosecuting serious penetrative sexual assaults.40 This idea of differential harm 
depending on the combination of the instrument of rape and the orifice invaded cannot be 
sustained when non-consensual sexual penetration is understood in terms of violation of the 
rights of the victim to her physical integrity and freedom from sexual invasion. In these terms it 
is immaterial whether the rapist’s penis invaded her vagina or her anus, or whether her vagina 
was violated by a penis or a bottle. Yet the law in India understands them as different harms, 
which can only be justified on the basis of the idea of chastity. Just as virginity of a virgin 
woman is affected only when her vagina is accessed by a man’s penis, the chastity of a non-
virgin chaste woman (i.e. married woman) is affected only in one kind of penetrative sexual 
intercourse. Therefore this one kind of sexual assault is the most harmful. The rest do not affect 
her chastity/virginity implying that they cannot be ‘rapes’; and so can be accommodated under 
legal provisions that are less serious and inadequate. The idea of chastity is inseparably 
associated with the patriarchal idea of male sexual property in women. A woman’s vagina and 
consequently her womb must be ideally accessed by one man, her married husband. Any other 
man’s access is an affront to the husband’s (or future husband’s) property rights. Rape laws in 
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 Either Section 354 or Section 377 IPC; the inadequacies of these laws will be discussed in the feminist judgment. 
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their earliest version were indeed property laws that forbade trespass into other men’s 
legitimate property rights in their own women.41  
In the Sakshi judgment, the Supreme Court of India, through its refusal to broaden the 
definition of rape to ‘other’ kinds of penetrative sexual assaults, in effect lent its support to 
this understanding of rape as an attack on a woman’s chastity and hence on legitimate male 
sexual rights. The existing marital rape exemption in Indian law too supports this explanation – 
there is no rape when a man sexually violates his wife, because the right to access her womb is 
already his. So in this conceptualisation of what is rape and what is not rape, the harm to a 
woman’s person is of no consequence. Her personal harms are invalidated when it causes no 
corresponding harm to any man who holds sexual rights in her. In my view then, this 
construction of the woman does not match the concept of the person in the Constitution who 
has the right to be equally treated by law as any other person; who also possesses the right to 
life with human dignity, which must include the right to be free from sexual violations; more 
so, when the same Court has already named (vaginal–penile) rape and sexual harassment as 
violations of the constitutional right to life.42 And because the court failed to construct the 
woman in criminal law as a person with constitutional rights, the interests of all kinds of other 
entities trumped her fundamental entitlement to have her harms of sexual violation validated 
by the law. The rule of stare decisis was upheld as no ‘grievous harm’ was held to be caused 
when the harm caused to her by penetrative sexual violence is graded on the basis of whether 
her chastity has been adversely affected. If the woman was constructed as a person, her rights 
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 N. Lacey, ‘Unspeakable Subjects, Impossible Rights: Sexuality, Integrity and Criminal Law’, Canadian Journal of 
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to be free from all kinds of sexual violence would have been equally respected. In my view, the 
inordinate emphasis on the interests of the society, legal fraternity and police personnel in the 
judgment and the absence of any meaningful discussion about the effect of inadequate 
redress of sexual violence on the victim’s constitutional rights is the result of her absence as a 
legal person.  
Her presence as a victim subject here is no more than a white-wash. She is not the victim 
subject unless the harms recognised by law are her harms. As the law stands now, the harms 
redressed are male harms, therefore the victim here is the man whose woman has been 
raped. The other victim envisaged here might be the patriarchal social order that is protected 
through the rape law – a social order where men respect each other’s sexual property in their 
women. In other words, the law is serving the same purpose as the criminal law of trespass. In 
trespass laws, the property accessed illegitimately is not the victim. Similarly, in Indian rape 
law, the woman raped is not the victim. The judicial discourse on rape too, however well-
packaged in the language of rights of the woman betrays a deep alignment with the 
patriarchal ideas of chastity and honour. The Supreme Court wrote in 2004 – 
‘Sexual violence apart from being a dehumanizing act is an unlawful intrusion *in+ 
the right of privacy and sanctity of a female. It is a serious blow to her supreme 
honour and offends her self-esteem and dignity; it degrades and humiliates the 
victim …. A rapist not only causes physical injuries but more indelibly leaves a scar 
on the most cherished possession of a woman, i.e. her dignity, honour, reputation 
and not the least her chastity.’43 
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My alternative judgment will align the concept of the woman in criminal law with the 
constitutional person. She will be constructed as a holder of constitutional rights, and non-
recognition and inadequate redress of her harms will be understood as violation of those rights. 
Harms inflicted on a woman by sexual invasion will be conceptualised solely as her personal 
harms and not as property harms to related men. The court will decide in favour of bringing a 
disconnection between the patriarchal notion of harms to female chastity and the concepts of 
rape and sexual violence in law; and consequently will judge in favour of the petition. 
Legal developments since the Sakshi judgment 
The Sakshi judgment was delivered by the Supreme Court of India in 2004. Seven years on, at 
the time I am writing the feminist alternative to it, not all of the laws being referred to have 
remained static and unchanged. The most relevant of the laws that have changed since 2004 is 
the application of the criminal law of unnatural sex. Section 377 IPC criminalised sexual 
intercourse against the order of nature, which included homosexual intercourse, sodomy and 
bestiality.44 It was also used to prosecute rapes of ‘other’ kinds though the crime of unnatural 
intercourse did not depend on absence of consent.  
In 2001, Naz Foundation, an NGO, filed a writ petition in the Delhi High Court challenging 
the constitutionality of Section 377 in relation to consensual homosexual intercourse. This too 
was a PIL brought under Article 226 of the Indian Constitution which confers on all High Courts 
in the country the power to enforce fundamental rights of individuals and groups by way of 
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issuing writs. The petition by Naz Foundation was dismissed by the Court in 2004 ‘on the 
ground that there is no cause of action in favour of the petitioner and that such a petition 
cannot be entertained to examine the academic challenge to the constitutionality of the 
legislation,’45  whatever that means. The matter went to the Supreme Court on appeal. The 
Supreme Court by an order dated 3rd February 2006 set aside the High Court’s decision of 
dismissal ‘observing that the matter does require consideration and is not of a nature which 
could have been dismissed on the aforesaid ground.’46 The petition was remitted to the Delhi 
High Court for consideration. 
On 2nd July 2009, the High Court declared that the criminalisation of consensual sexual 
activity of adults in private indeed violates Articles 21 (right to life), 14 (right to equal legal 
treatment) and 15 (right to non-discriminatory treatment by the state) of the Constitution.47 
Section 377 IPC will continue to be applicable in cases of non-consensual non-vaginal-penile 
penetrative sexual violence until the Parliament chooses to amend the law to make better 
provisions for these ‘other’ kinds of rapes.48 
So as the law stands now, Section 377 applies to only penetrative sexual violence of the 
‘other’ kinds and not to consensual sex. This solves the problem for persons seeking de-
criminalisation of homosexual intercourse and is indeed a legal landmark in the struggle to 
attain recognition for the constitutional rights of sexual minorities. But this does not solve the 
problem of inadequate redress for ‘other’ kinds of rapes. The fact that Section 377 now only 
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applies to non-consensual sex with adults and consensual or non-consensual sex with minors 
has brought the factor of consent into play here, which was absent from the earlier version of 
the provision and which is perfectly desirable. Yet the provision still marks ‘other’ kinds of rapes 
and hence sexual intercourse as ‘unnatural’, and separates them from the ‘proper’ kind of rape 
and hence sexual intercourse which is penile-vaginal. In spite of the remarkable and extremely 
important 2009 High Court judgment in the Naz Foundation case, a feminist alternative version 
of the Sakshi judgment is still relevant as the division of natural and unnatural rapes, hence 
natural and unnatural sex is steeped in the patriarchal ideas of compulsory heterosexuality and 
male sexual property in women, and is unsustainable from a feminist point of view. The current 
narrow definition of rape still needs to be contested. 
The High Court decision also says that this partial application of Section 377 will hold until 
the Parliament makes the necessary amendments in the law to implement the 
recommendations of the 172nd report of the Law Commission of India49 which the Court thinks 
will remove ‘a great deal of confusion.’50 This report has recommended a complete overhaul of 
the rape laws into the following provision on sexual assault. According to the High Court –
‘pertinently, the major thrust of the recommendation is on the word ‘Person’ which makes the 
sexual offences gender neutral unlike gender specific as under the ‘Rape Laws’ which is the 
current position in statute book.’51 I will not go into a detailed discussion of this recommended 
gender neutral law of sexual assault, both because such a law has still not been enacted, and 
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also because I do not want the current paper on the alternative feminist judgment to Sakshi v. 
Union of India to go off on a tangent from its central focus. Yet I would like to quote what 
Ngaire Naffine has to say on the gender neutral laws of sexual assault in Australia – 
‘In the modern Australian law of rape, men and women are now formal equal legal subjects 
(and objects). Each is now recognised to have the ability to rape the other… The liberal 
solution to equal sexual rights for women has been to effect a crude reversal and 
reciprocity of sex rights and responsibilities – to make women the same as men. The 
modern grant of sexual subjectivity to women, taken to its logical liberal end, as Australia 
has done, seems to entail the legal recognition of women’s sexual ability to rape. Women 
are now seen to have so much potency to do what it was once thought only men could do 
to women that there now needs to be a law to prevent us from doing this to men. What 
this neatly steps around is the nature of the male violence which (ostensibly) rape laws are 
designed to punish. … The published crime statistics make clear that it is still men who rape 
women, while the unofficial statistics reveal that most women feel too powerless to do 
anything about it. And so what could be read as a recognition of the potential sexual power 
of women has (of course) not turned women into rapists. The gender neutrality of the new 
laws only mystifies the profoundly sexed nature of the crime of rape and the unequal 
nature of the society which allows it to occur. Indeed, the new laws seem no longer to be 
about the very behaviour that the crime of rape was meant to proscribe.’52  
 
Guidelines to feminist judgment-writing 
 
Before I embark on the exercise of writing the feminist judgment, some general points about 
the technicalities of judgment writing must be made.  
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Firstly, I am following the Indian judicial convention here of outlining the primary 
arguments of the parties in detail before stating the court’s own opinion about the points in 
contention. Accordingly the ensuing judgment starts with a detailed outline of the arguments 
put forward by the petitioner, followed by the arguments submitted by the respondents and 
then ultimately followed by the court’s own reasoning leading to its decision. So I would 
request the reader not to mistake the initial paragraphs to be the court’s own reasoning. I have 
made every effort to make clear at the beginning of each paragraph whose argument is being 
presented.  
Secondly, as it is a judgment and not a case note or article, the mode of presentation is 
fundamentally different.53 Feminist scholars most often are mindful of their own positionality 
and the non-universality of their positions. A nuanced, self-reflexive approach is the hallmark of 
effective feminist writing. Yet, in a feminist judgment, the judge’s voice has to attain and 
maintain the authority that will sustain its credibility. Therefore it may not be possible to 
acknowledge the positionality of the feminist judge or other possible alternative approaches in 
the judgment. Moreover as there are many strands of feminism, my feminist judgment may not 
be able to encompass all feminist positions or theorisations. It is one of many feminist 
judgments that are possible on a certain case. But that too cannot be acknowledged within the 
judgment. In gist, even though the stated aim of the writing of the feminist judgment is to 
expose the positionality of the original judges, it is not done in the usual way of critiquing their 
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positionality; it is simply done by providing one of the many possible alternatives to the original 
judgment. In her introduction to the Women’s Court of Canada, Diana Majury writes –  
‘One of our points in writing these decisions is to demonstrate that the Supreme Court of 
Canada decision in each of these cases is but one of many decisions that could have been 
written. The same of course applies to the decisions of the Women’s Court of Canada. We 
hope that future judges of the Women’s Court, as well as others, will review our decisions 
and challenge, extend, or revise our equality analysis.’54 
Thirdly, again because this is a judgment and not a critical case-note, the voice that speaks has 
to be decisive and not suggestive.55 In my judgment I have taken care so that the judge’s voice 
may sound more authoritative than that of a legal scholar. This is an emulation of the actual 
voices that speak judgments in Indian courts and is necessary to be adopted in order to make 
the feminist alternative as close as possible in style to an original judgment by the Indian 
judiciary. 
Fourthly, I have not referred to feminist theories within the judgment. This is because a 
too overt assertion of the theoretical lenses used by the judge may destabilise the authority of 
the view taken through the lens. My judgment is not intended to be a discourse on feminist 
theories. It is, on the contrary, a judicial decision taken from a feminist viewpoint. The allusions 
to feminist theorisations are kept to the minimum, so that it can compete in credibility and 
authority with the original patriarchal judgment which does not of course acknowledge its 
positionality. Rosemary Hunter writes regarding the place of feminist theorising in feminist 
judgments – 
                                                          
54
 Majury, ‘Introducing the Women’s Court of Canada’ at 8 
55
 Hunter, McGlynn and Rackley (eds.) (2010) at 15 
feminists@law  Vol 1, No 2 (2011) 
_____________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
____________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
25 
 
‘As a technical matter, feminist or any other kind of scholarship does not constitute legal 
authority, and thus cannot form part of the ratio of a judge’s decision. What is important is 
the account of the facts, the exposition of the law, and the application of the latter to the 
former. Empirical research and policy material may properly be incorporated as part of the 
reasoning process involved in the performance of these tasks, but the philosophical 
approach underlying their execution does not form part of the judgment itself. …feminist 
judging is not about theorising, but requires moving from theory to practice.’56 
And finally, as this is a 2004 judgment of the Supreme Court of India, I have not incorporated 
any legal developments since. For example, as discussed earlier in the paper, in 2009 the law 
criminalising ‘unnatural’ sexual intercourse among consenting adults was declared 
unconstitutional by the Delhi High Court.57 But I have not talked about it in the judgment as it is 
intended to be an alternative judgment that the Court could have written in 2004 if women’s 
rights were afforded the importance warranted under the constitutional mandate.  
 
The Feminist Judgment  
Sakshi v Union of India 
Equivalent Citations – AIR 2004 SC 3566; 2004 (2) ALD Cri 504; [2004] 3 LRI 242 
Writ Petition (CRL) No. 33 of 1997 (Under Article 32, Constitution of India) with SLP (CRL) Nos. 
1672-1673 of 2000 
Supreme Court of India (Civil Original Jurisdiction) 
Decision Date: 26 May 2004 
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Bench – M. Mukherjee J. 
Judgment: 
M. Mukherjee J. – [1] This public interest litigation under Article 32 of the Indian Constitution 
has been filed by Sakshi, a charitable support organisation for providing legal, medical, 
psychological, residential and other support to women, especially to victims of sexual violence. 
The Respondents named in the petition are –  
i. Union of India 
ii. Ministry of Law and Justice, and 
iii. Commissioner of Police, New Delhi. 
 
 
[2] The reliefs claimed by the Petitioners are to – 
a) Declare by appropriate writ or direction that the definition of ‘sexual intercourse’ in 
Section 375 of the Indian Penal Code 1860 (henceforth IPC) shall include all forms of 
penetrative sexual acts such as vaginal-penile, oral-penile, anal-penile, vaginal-finger, 
anal-finger, anal-object and vaginal-object penetration; 
b) Consequently issue a writ, order or direction to the Respondents and its servants and 
agents to register all cases of penetrative sexual violence as offences falling within the 
broadened interpretation of sexual intercourse under Section 375 IPC 1860; 
c) Issue such other writ, order or direction, as the Court may consider appropriate. 
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[3] In the petition, the Petitioner professes growing concern at the striking growth in incidences 
of sexual violence towards women and children in India in recent times. In response to this 
growing trend, the Respondents have increasingly implemented Sections 354 (outraging the 
modesty of a woman), 375/376 (rape) and 377 (unnatural sexual intercourse) IPC for 
prosecuting these offences. It is submitted that the Respondents apply the rape provisions in 
Sections 375/376 IPC only for the prosecution of sexual violence that involves penile 
penetration of the vagina. All other types of penetrative sexual violence (henceforth referred to 
as PSV) are treated as lesser offences and prosecuted under Sections 354 and 377 of the IPC. 
The Petitioner claims that the offences of sexual abuse of children and women that often 
involve PSV other than vaginal-penile are no less traumatic for the victims. Therefore they 
should be brought within the ambit of the definition of rape under Section 375 IPC. 
[4] The Petitioner argues that the narrow interpretation of rape in the IPC as involving only 
vaginal-penile penetration does not conform with the contemporary understanding of rape as 
an act aimed at sexually humiliating, violating and degrading a woman or child, adversely 
affecting their sexual integrity and autonomy.  
[5] The Petitioner refers to the established body of feminist theory which argues rape to be an 
act of violence with intent to degrade and humiliate the victim and not merely a sexual act. The 
Petitioner quotes feminist scholar Susan Brownmiller – 
‘…in rape …the intent is not merely to “take”, but to humiliate and degrade…  Sexual 
assault in our day and age is hardly restricted to forced genital copulation, nor is it 
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exclusively a male-on-female offence. Tradition and biologic opportunity have rendered 
vaginal rape a particular political crime with a particular political history, but the 
invasion may occur through the mouth or the rectum as well. And while the penis may 
remain the rapist's favourite weapon, his prime instrument of vengeance… it is not in 
fact his only tool. Sticks, bottles and even fingers are often substituted for the “natural” 
thing. And as men may invade women through other orifices, so too, do they invade 
other men. Who is to say that the sexual humiliation suffered through forced oral or 
rectal penetration is a lesser violation of the personal, private inner space, a lesser injury 
to mind, spirit and sense of self?’ (Susan Brownmiller, Against Our Will, 1986) 
*6+ The Petitioner further submits that the term ‘sexual intercourse’ has not been defined in 
Section 375 IPC. Therefore it is open to judicial interpretation. Moreover, the IPC does not 
define the term ‘penetration’ as only vaginal-penile penetration. Therefore the term 
‘penetration’ too can be interpreted by the Court to include all types of sexual penetration. The 
wording of the definition of rape contained in Section 375 IPC is in itself wide enough in scope 
to cover all kinds of penetrative sexual violence. The narrow interpretation of the definition by 
the respondent authorities particularly defeats the purpose of the Criminal Law Amendment 
Act 1983 that inserted sub-section (2)(f) in Section 376 IPC.58  
[7] The Petitioner claims that the narrow interpretation of rape denies victims of sexual abuse 
access to justice and thus violates their fundamental rights under Articles 1459 and 2160 of the 
Constitution. 
                                                          
58
 S. 376(2)(f) provides for increased punishment for rape of a girl below 12 years of age. 
59
 Article 14: ‘Equality before law – The State shall not deny to any person equality before the law or the equal 
protection of the laws within the territory of India Prohibition of discrimination on grounds of religion, race, caste, 
sex or place of birth.’ 
feminists@law  Vol 1, No 2 (2011) 
_____________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
____________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
29 
 
[8] The Petitioner further submits that the respondent authorities have failed to take into 
account the legislative purpose of Section 377 IPC. 61  This provision was enacted for 
criminalising certain kinds of homosexual intercourse and using it for prosecuting penetrative 
sexual violence is against its legislative purpose. The Petitioner refers to the Law Commission 
Report (No. 42) of 197162 where the Commission discusses the relevance of Section 377 only in 
relation to homosexual offences (pages 280-282). 
*9+ In light of the Law Commission’s statement regarding the purpose of Section 377 IPC, the 
Petitioner claims that the Respondents have been wrongly prosecuting cases of PSV under the 
section. Penetrative sexual assaults are crimes of violence and not of moral turpitude as may 
seem from their prosecution under Section 377. The respondents have wrongly stretched the 
meaning of ‘unnatural sexual offences’ to bring penetrative sexual assaults within its purview 
and have trivialised serious cases of sexual assault by equating them with the offence of 
‘consensual homosexuality’. This trivialisation too is a violation of the victims’ fundamental 
rights to equality under Article 14 and to life with human dignity under Article 21 of the 
Constitution. 
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[10] It is also submitted by the Petitioner that Article 15(3) of the Constitution of India permits 
the State to make special provisions for women and children. ‘Special provision’ necessarily 
implies ‘adequate’ provision. The narrow interpretation of rape under Sections 375/376 used 
by the respondent authorities and their agents have rendered the effect of the ‘special 
provision’ under Section 376(2)(f)63 meaningless and ineffective in certain cases, which is a 
violation of Article 15(3) of the Constitution of India. 
[11] The Petitioner further refers to the United Nations Convention on Right of the Child (CRC) 
ratified by the Union of India (Respondent No. 1) on 11th December 1992 and the United 
Nations Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) ratified by 
the same Respondent on 9th July 1993. Consequently, Respondent No. 1 and the other 
Respondents, as agents of Respondent No. 1, have an international legal obligation to honour 
its commitments under the respective Conventions. In the present case the narrow 
interpretation of rape imposed by the Respondents and their other agents completely violates 
such commitments. 
[12] The Petitioner has also argued that Section 375 IPC should be interpreted in relevance to 
recent times when child abuse has assumed alarming proportions. In support of the submission, 
the petitioner has referred to F.A.R. Bennion’s Statutory Interpretation (Butterworths 1984) at 
page 355-356: 
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‘While it remains law, an Act is to be treated as always speaking. In its application on any 
date, the language of the Act, though necessarily embedded in its own time, is nevertheless 
to be construed in accordance with the need to treat it as current law. … 
It is presumed that Parliament intends the Court to apply to an ongoing Act a 
construction that continuously updates its wording to allow for changes since the Act was 
initially framed. 
In particular where, owing to developments occurring since the original passing of an 
enactment, a counter-mischief comes into existence or increases, it is presumed that 
Parliament intends the Court so to construe the enactment as to minimise the adverse 
effects of the counter-mischief.’ 
 [13] In this connection, the Petitioner has also referred to S. Gopal Reddy v. State of A.P. 1996 
SCC (4) 596, the Court quoted the following words of Lord Denning in Seaford Court Estates v. 
Asher [1949] 2 All ER 153 – 
‘... It would certainly save the Judges trouble if Acts of Parliament were drafted with divine 
prescience and perfect clarity. In the absence of it, when a defect appears a Judge cannot 
simply fold his hands and blame the draftsman. He must set to work on the constructive 
task of finding the intention of Parliament, and he must do this not only from the language 
of the statute, but also from a consideration of the social conditions which gave rise to it, 
and of the mischief which it was passed to remedy, and then he must supplement the 
written word so as to give “force and life” to the intention of the legislature ... A Judge 
should ask himself the question: If the makers of the Act had themselves come across this 
ruck in the texture of it, how would they have straightened it out? He must then do as they 
would have done. A Judge must not alter the material of which the Act is woven, but he can 
and should iron out the creases.’ 
[14] Accordingly, the Court in S. Gopal Reddy held that it is a well-known rule of interpretation 
of statutes that the text and the context of the entire Act must be looked into while 
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interpreting any of the expressions used in a statute and that the courts must look to the object 
which the statute seeks to achieve while interpreting any of the provisions of the Act, and a 
purposive approach is necessary.  
[15] In support of the claim for purposive interpretation of Section 375 IPC, the Petitioner has 
also made reference to Directorate of Enforcement v. Deepak Mahajan and Anr. AIR 1994 SC 
1775, where the Court held that a mere mechanical interpretation of the words devoid of 
concept or purpose will reduce most legislation to futility and that it is a salutary rule, well 
established, that the intention of the legislature must be found by reading the statute as a 
whole. Accordingly, certain provisions of Foreign Exchange Regulation Act (FERA), which has 
since the current petition been replaced by the Foreign Exchange Management Act (FEMA) in 
2000, and the Customs Act were interpreted keeping in mind that the said enactments were 
enacted for the economic development of the country and the augmentation of revenue. The 
Court did not accept the literal interpretation suggested by the respondent therein and held 
that sub-section (1) and (2) of Section 167 Criminal Procedure Code (CrPC) are evenly applicable 
with regard to the production and detention of a person arrested under the provisions of 
Section 35 of FERA and Section 104 of the Customs Act and that a magistrate has jurisdiction 
under Section 167(2) CrPC to authorise the detention of a person arrested by an authorised 
officer of the Enforcement Directorate under FERA and taken to the magistrate in compliance 
with Section 35(2) of FERA. 
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[16] The Petitioner has submitted that such a purposive judicial approach to the interpretation 
of statutes has been adopted in countries like the UK and South Africa to prevent offenders 
slipping out of the loopholes in law. Some decisions of the House of Lords have been cited to 
support the claims, the most notable being R v. R (1991) 4 All ER 481 where it was held that the 
marital rape exemption can no longer form part of the law of England as the proposition that by 
marriage the wife submits herself irrevocably to sexual intercourse in all circumstances is 
unacceptable under modern socio-moral standards. Hence the word ‘unlawful’ in the definition 
of rape in Section 1(1) of the Sexual Offences (Amendment) Act 1976, is to be interpreted as 
mere surplusage and not as meaning ‘outside marriage’, as it is clearly unlawful to have sexual 
intercourse with any woman without her consent. 
[17] The other decision cited by the counsel for the Petitioner is Regina v. Burstow and Regina 
v. Ireland [1997] 4 All ER 225 where a person accused of repeated silent telephone calls to 
women accompanied on occasion by heavy breathing was held guilty of causing psychiatric 
injury amounting to bodily harm under Section 42 of the Offences against the Person Act 1861. 
In the course of the discussion, Lord Steyn observed that criminal law has moved on in the light 
of a developing understanding of the link between the body and psychiatric injury and, as a 
matter of current usage, the contextual interpretation of ‘inflict’ can embrace the idea of one 
person inflicting psychiatric injury on another. The Petitioner has laid emphasis on the following 
passage in the judgment: 
‘The proposition that the Victorian legislator when enacting Sections 18, 20 and 47 of the 
Act of 1861, would not have had in mind psychiatric illness is no doubt correct. Psychiatry 
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was in its infancy in 1861. But the subjective intention of the draftsman is immaterial. The 
only relevant enquiry is as to the sense of the words in the context in which they are used. 
Moreover the Act of 1861 is a statute of the “always speaking” type: the statute must be 
interpreted in the light of the best current scientific appreciation of the link between the 
body and psychiatric injury.’ 
[18] The counsel for the Petitioner has also referred to a decision of the Constitutional Court of 
South Africa in National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality and Ors. v. The Minister of Home 
Affairs and Ors.  (Case CCT 10/99) wherein it was held that Section 25(5) of the Aliens Control 
Act 96 of 1991, by omitting to confer on persons, who are partners in permanent same-sex life 
partnerships, the benefits it extends to spouses, unfairly discriminates, on the grounds of their 
sexual orientation and marital status, against partners in such same-sex partnerships who are 
permanently and lawfully resident in the Republic. Such unfair discrimination limits the equality 
rights of such partners guaranteed to them by Section 9 of the Constitution and their right to 
dignity under Section 10. It was further held that it would not be an appropriate remedy to 
declare the whole of Section 25(5) invalid. Instead, it would be appropriate to read in, after the 
word ‘spouse’ in the section, the words ‘or partner, in a permanent same-sex life partnership’. 
For similar reasoning, in relation to the increased incidence of child abuse in recent times, it has 
been argued that the words ‘sexual intercourse’ in Section 375 IPC must be given a larger 
meaning than has been traditionally understood.  
[19] The Petitioner has, furthermore, placed before the Court judgments dated 10th December 
1998 and 22nd February 2001 by the International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons 
Responsible for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the 
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Territory of the Former Yugoslavia since 1991 (ICTY). Under Article 5 of the Statute of the 
International Tribunal, rape is a crime against humanity. Rape may also amount to a grave 
breach of the Geneva Conventions, a violation of the laws or customs of war or an act of 
genocide if the requisite elements are met, and may be prosecuted accordingly. The Trial 
Chamber took note of the fact that no definition of rape could be found in international law 
and therefore formulated the following definition: 
‘… the Trial Chamber finds that the following may be accepted as the objective elements of 
rape: (i) the sexual penetration, however slight:  
(a) of the vagina or anus of the victim by the penis of the perpetrator or any other 
object used by the perpetrator; or 
(b) of a mouth of the victim by the penis of the perpetrator; 
(ii) by coercion or force or threat of force against the victim or a third person.’ 
In the second judgment of the Trial Chamber dated 22nd February 2001, the interpretation of 
rape which focussed on serious violations of a sexual autonomy was accepted. 
[20] Mrs. G. Mukerjee, Director in the Ministry of Home Affairs, has filed the counter-affidavit 
on behalf of Respondents Nos. 1 and 2.  The main points of the counter-affidavit are –  
a) That the respondents have kept in mind their obligation under Article 15(3) to make 
special/adequate provisions for women and children. Sections 375 and 376 have been 
substantially changed by the Criminal Law (Amendment) Act 1983. The same Act has 
also introduced several new Sections viz. 376A, 376B, 376C and 376D IPC. These 
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amendments have been effected with a view to provide special/adequate provisions for 
women and children.  
b) The term ‘rape’ has been clearly defined under Section 375 IPC and there is little scope 
for confusion as to the purported meaning of the offence.  
c) Penetrations other than vaginal-penile penetration are unnatural sexual offences. 
Section 377 provides severe punishments for such offences. The punishment provided 
under Section 377 is imprisonment for life or imprisonment of either description for a 
term which may extend to 10 years and shall also be liable to fine. Punishment under 
Section 377 is no less severe than that provided for rape in Section 376. Therefore, it 
cannot be said that penetrative sexual violence other than vaginal-penile rape is not 
dealt with seriously by the respondent authorities. The offences as mentioned by the 
petitioner i.e. anal-penile penetration, oral-penile penetration, anal-finger penetration, 
vaginal-finger penetration or vaginal-object penetration are serious sexual offences of 
unnatural nature and are sufficiently covered under Section 377 which provides 
stringent punishment. Therefore, the plea of the petitioner that offences under Section 
377 are treated as lesser offences is incorrect.  
d) Sections 354 and 506 have been framed with a view to punish the lesser offence of 
criminal assault in the form of outraging the modesty of a woman.  Section 354 IPC 
provides for punishment for assault or criminal force on a woman to outrage her 
modesty. Unnatural sexual offences cannot be brought under the ambit of this Section. 
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e) Section 376(2)(f) provides stringent punishment for committing rape on a woman when 
she is under the age of 12 years. But child sexual abuse other than vaginal-penile 
penetration is obviously unnatural and is to be dealt with under Section 377 IPC. Rape 
defined under Section 375 is vaginal-penile penetration and all other sorts of 
penetrations are considered to be unnatural sexual offences. Section 377 provides 
stringent enough punishment to adequately deal with such offences.   
f) It is denied that current interpretation of Sections 375, 376 and 377 violate the 
fundamental rights under Articles 14, 15(3) and 21 of the Constitution of India. Sections 
375 and 376 clearly deal with only penile-vaginal rapes and all types of unnatural sexual 
offences are adequately dealt with under Section 377 IPC. 
[21] Shri R.N. Trivedi, Additional Solicitor General, appearing for the Respondents, has 
submitted the following – 
a) The international treaties ratified by India can be taken into account for framing 
guidelines in respect of the enforcement of fundamental rights but only in the absence 
of municipal laws as held in Vishaka v. State of Rajasthan AIR 1997 SC 3011 and Lakshmi 
Kant Pandey v. Union of India AIR 1984 SC 469. In the presence of existing law, 
subsequent ratification of international treaties would not render existing municipal 
laws ultra vires of treaties in cases of inconsistency. In such an event the State through 
its legislature may modify the law to bring it in accord with treaty obligations. Such 
matters are in the realm of State policy and are, therefore, not enforceable in a Court of 
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law. It has been further submitted that in International law, ratified treaties can be 
deemed incorporated in customary law but only if the former are consistent with the 
domestic laws or decisions of its judicial tribunals.  
b) The decision of the ICTY cannot be used for interpretation of Section 354 and 375 IPC 
and other provisions, due to the limited temporal and territorial jurisdiction of ICTY. 
Even decisions of the International Court of Justice (henceforth ICJ) are binding only on 
the parties to a dispute in view of Articles 92, 93 and 94 of the UN Charter and Articles 
59 and 63 of the ICJ Statutes.  
c) No writ of mandamus can be issued to the Parliament by the judiciary to amend any law 
or to bring it in accord with treaty obligations. It is also submitted that Sections 354 and 
375 IPC have been interpreted in innumerable decisions of various High Courts and also 
of the Supreme Court and the consistent view is that to hold a person guilty of rape, 
penile penetration is essential. The law on the point is similar both in England and USA.  
In State of Punjab v. Major Singh 1966 (Supp) SCR 266 it was held that if the hymen is 
ruptured by inserting a finger, it would not amount to rape.  
d) A writ petition under Article 32 of the Constitution would not lie for reversing earlier 
decisions of the Court on the supposed ground that a restrictive interpretation has been 
given to certain provisions of a statute. 
[22] The Respondents have placed reliance on Volume 11(1) of Halsbury's Laws of England para 
514 (Butterworths 1990) wherein unlawful sexual intercourse with a woman without her 
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consent has been held to be an essential ingredient of rape. Reference has also been made to 
Volume 75 Corpus Juris Secundum para 10, wherein it is stated that sexual penetration of a 
female is a necessary element of the crime of rape, but the slightest penetration of the body of 
the female by the sexual organ of the male is sufficient.  
[23] The Respondents have also referred to the Principles of Public International Law by Ian 
Brownlie, where the author, after referring to some decisions of the English courts has 
expressed an opinion that the clear words of a statute bind the court even if the provisions are 
contrary to international law and that there is no such thing as a standard of international law 
extraneous to the domestic law of a Kingdom and that international law as such can confer no 
rights cognisable in the municipal courts.  
[24] The counsel for the Respondents has also referred to Dicey and Morris on The Conflict of 
Laws wherein, in the Chapter on the Enforcement of Foreign Law, the following rule has been 
stated: 
‘English Courts will not enforce or recognise a right, power, capacity, disability or legal 
relationship arising under the law of a foreign country, if the enforcement or recognition of 
such right, power, capacity, disability or legal relationship would be inconsistent with the 
fundamental public policy of English law.’ 
With regard to penal law, it has been stated as under: 
‘The common law considers crimes as altogether local and cognisable and punishable 
exclusively in the country where they are committed… Chief Justice Marshall, in delivering 
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the opinion of the Supreme Court, said: “The Courts of no country execute the penal laws of 
another”.’ 
[25] This Court on 13th January 1998 referred the matter to the Law Commission of India for its 
opinion on the main issues in the Petition, namely, whether all forms of PSV should come 
within the ambit of Section 375 IPC and whether any change in statutory provisions is advisable. 
The Law Commission considered the matters in its 172nd Report 64  and recommended 
substitution of the rape laws altogether with the laws of ‘sexual assault’ in the IPC. The criminal 
provision for sexual assault will contain other kinds of PSV within its ambit.65 As is evident, 
these amendments can only be done by the legislature; therefore the Law Commission did not 
favour the widening of the meaning of ‘penetration’ by judicial interpretation, though it agreed 
in principle with the arguments of the Petitioner.  
[26] Relevant here is an earlier report (156th Report)66 of the Commission. Initially, after the 
referral on 13th January 1998, the Law Commission by an affidavit dated 25th March 1998 
brought to the notice of this Court that the 156th Report of 1997 has dealt, inter alia, with the 
issues raised in the current petition. On the Court’s insistence that the Commission deals with 
the precise issues of the current petition anew, the 172nd Report was born. The following are 
the relevant extracts from the Commission’s recommendations from the earlier report – 
‘9.59 Sexual-child abuse may be committed in various forms such as sexual intercourse, 
carnal intercourse and sexual assaults. The cases involving penile penetration into vagina 
                                                          
64
 172
nd
 Report  of the Law Commission of India, ‘Review of Rape Laws’, 2000 
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 Report of the Law Commission of India, 1997 
feminists@law  Vol 1, No 2 (2011) 
_____________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
____________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
41 
 
are covered under Section 375 of the IPC. If there is any case of penile oral penetration and 
penile penetration into anus, Section 377 IPC dealing with unnatural offences, i.e., carnal 
intercourse against the order of nature with any man, woman or animal, adequately takes 
care of them. If acts such as penetration of a finger or any inanimate object into vagina or 
anus are committed against a woman or a female child, the provisions of the proposed 
Section 354 IPC whereunder a more severe punishment is also prescribed, can be invoked 
and, as regards the male child, the penal provisions of the IPC concerning 'hurt', 'criminal 
force' or 'assault' as the case may be, would be attracted. A distinction has to be naturally 
maintained between sexual assault/use of criminal force falling under Section 354, sexual 
offences falling under Section 375 and unnatural offences falling under Section 377 of the 
Indian Penal Code. It may not be appropriate to bring unnatural offences punishable under 
Section 377 IPC or mere sexual assault or mere sexual use of criminal force which may 
attract Section 354 IPC within the ambit of 'rape' which is a distinct and graver offence with 
a definite connotation.’ 
[27] Regarding Section 377 IPC, the Law Commission recommended that in view of the on-going 
instances of sexual abuse in the country where unnatural offences are committed on persons 
under the age of eighteen years, there should be a minimum mandatory sentence of 
imprisonment for a term not less than two years but may extend to seven years and a fine, with 
a proviso that for adequate and special reasons to be recorded in the judgment, a sentence of 
less than two years may be imposed.  
[28] Therefore, the legal questions under contention in the current case before the Court are –  
a) Whether the definition of ‘rape’ under Section 375 IPC should include all kinds of 
penetrative sexual violence; 
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b) Whether the narrow interpretation of the term ‘rape’ by the Respondent authorities 
violates the victim’s fundamental rights under Articles 14, 15(3) and 21 of the 
Constitution; 
c) Whether this Court can use its power of Judicial Review to widen the interpretation of 
‘rape’; 
d) Whether widening the definition will amount to a violation of the rule of stare decisis 
which will adversely affect the stability of the criminal law; 
e) Whether the State’s commitments under international law may be taken in 
consideration in judicial decisions even if the legislature has not implemented the 
international commitments into municipal laws; 
f) Whether decisions of Courts in other common law jurisdictions may influence domestic 
judicial decisions; and 
g) Whether the decisions of International Courts may influence domestic judicial decision-
making in India. 
[29] The first point of contention is the meaning of the term ‘rape’. Should penile penetration 
of the vagina be essential to constitute the offence of rape? To answer this, we must get to the 
root of the differentiation between vaginal-penile ‘rape’ and other kinds of PSV (the not-rapes). 
The Law Commission, in its 156th Report,  says – ‘A distinction has to be naturally maintained 
between sexual assault/use of criminal force falling under Section 354, sexual offences falling 
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under Section 375 and unnatural offences falling under Section 377 of the Indian Penal Code.’ 
The Commission describes vaginal-penile rape under Section 375 IPC as a ‘distinct and graver 
offence with a definite connotation.’ 
[30] The assumptions behind the Commission’s opinion are – vaginal-penile rape is ‘naturally’ 
distinct from other kinds of PSV; and vaginal-penile rapes are graver violence than all other PSV 
and somehow that special gravity is connected with the ‘definite connotation’ attached to 
vaginal-penile rapes. The Commission does not expand on what it means by the natural 
distinction between the various kinds of PSV or the definite connotation of vaginal-penile rape 
or on why vaginal-penile rape is seen as the graver one. 
*31+ This Court deems it necessary to clarify this ‘natural distinction’ between different kinds of 
PSVs. Historically, the law of rape was concerned with the theft of a woman’s virginity (if she is 
unmarried) or chastity (if she is married). Just as a woman’s virginity is lost only when a penis 
accesses her vagina, and not when it accesses her anus or mouth, so too is the case of chastity. 
A woman’s chastity is perceived to be lost only in one kind of PSV – vaginal-penile rape. A 
woman’s virginity and chastity are preserved as long as her vagina is not accessed by the penis 
of a man other than her legally married husband. Chastity therefore is not mere sexual 
faithfulness in marriage but exclusive sexual access to the wife’s vagina by the husband. Anal 
rape or forced fellatio do not affect a woman’s virginity, and nor do they affect her chastity in 
case she is married. This is where vaginal-penile rape gets its traditional ‘definite connotation’ 
from. It is a graver offence because it affects a woman’s status as ‘exclusive to one-man’. 
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[32] The understanding of rape as taking away of a woman’s chastity is likely to have stemmed 
from a patriarchal concern to ascertain a child’s paternity. A woman who is sexually exclusive 
will give birth to the offspring of one man. The concern for sexual ‘purity’ of a woman is a way 
of controlling and channelling female sexuality (and reproductive capacity) to serve patriarchal 
interests – maintaining the patrilineal family line. The woman in India very rarely maintains her 
own familial line. Her children cannot take forward her father’s lineage; they continue her 
husband’s familial line. To ascertain the paternity of her children she must be exclusive to one 
man. Vaginal-penile rape within this understanding is an interference with the essential sexual 
exclusivity of a woman. For the same reason the Indian Penal Code does not criminalise 
husbands who rape their wives.  
[33] So the emphasis here is not on the personal harm of the woman, but on whether her 
chastity is affected by the rape. PSV that does not involve the penis and vagina does not affect 
her chastity; hence it is not termed rape. As marital rape does not violate a husband’s right to 
exclusive access to his wife’s sexuality and reproductive capacity, it is not criminalised. As only 
non-marital vaginal-penile sexual violence affect a woman’s ability to be ‘exclusive to one man’ 
in present or in future, it is termed rape and criminalised.  
[34] This classification may have seemed reasonable at the time this law was brought into force, 
yet it should not be continued as law in today’s context. Every person within the territory of 
India has the Constitutional right to demand equal protection from the laws. A woman who is 
sexually violated has the right to demand redress for the violation of her bodily and sexual 
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integrity irrespective of whether her (present or future) husband’s right to exclusive sexual 
access to her is affected or not. She is entitled to redress for the harm that has been inflicted on 
her physical and mental state and for the infringement of her right to privacy and sexual 
autonomy.  
[35] A woman, irrespective of her marital status, has the right to decide when, where and with 
whom she wants to participate in sexual intercourse and the law must protect that right with its 
full force. And having sex can include all kinds of penetrative sexual acts. Sexual penetration 
when non-consensual is injurious because of the absence of consent and not because of the 
particular combination of body parts. Therefore, there is no reason to believe that insertion of 
penis into the anus or mouth of the woman and the insertion of other things like a finger or 
inanimate objects into the vagina and anus of the woman are lesser injuries than the insertion 
of penis into a woman’s vagina.  
[36] This Court agrees that there is ample reason why the definition of rape in Section 375 
should include anal-penile, anal-object, anal-finger, vaginal-finger, vaginal-object, and oral-
penile PSV along with vaginal-penile PSV. And even if there are other provisions in the IPC that 
adequately redress these other kinds of violations, there is no justification for maintaining the 
distinction between vaginal-penile rape and the other kinds. The very distinction indicates the 
patriarchal essence of rape as an offence against the male right to exclusive access to a womb. 
The offence of rape must be reformulated as harm against the person of a woman; as an 
infringement to her right to choose when, where and with whom she wants to act sexually; and 
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a violation of her integrity as a person. And in this understanding there is no distinction 
between the different kinds of penetrative sexual violence. They all equally violate the woman. 
[37] The Respondents argued that there are provisions other than Section 375 which 
adequately deal with the other kinds of PSV. For reasons stated earlier adequate redress by 
other provisions should not affect the decision whether to broaden the definition of rape. The 
definition of rape should include all kinds of PSV primarily because of the need to effect a shift 
in the understanding of rape as a violation of chastity to a violation of individual rights to 
personal integrity and sexual choice. At the same time, the related and relevant question of 
whether acts of PSV other than vaginal-penile rapes are adequately redressed by the current 
law needs to be settled.  
[38] The two provisions that presently deal with other kinds of PSV are Sections 354 and 377 
IPC. Section 354 criminalises the application of criminal force to a woman with intent to outrage 
her modesty. The maximum punishment stipulated is imprisonment for two years and/or fine. 
In this Court’s view this provision is not adequate to deal with any kind of PSV as the wording is 
ambiguous and the punishment negligible. Modesty has not been defined in the statute. This 
Court has attempted to define the term in the recent case of Aman Kumar and Anr. v. State of 
Haryana 2004 AIR SC 1497 in the following way –‘Modesty can be described as the quality of 
being modest; and in relation to women, “womanly propriety of behaviour; scrupulous chastity 
of thought speech and conduct”. It is the reserve or sense of shame proceeding from instinctive 
aversion to impure or coarse suggestions.’ The online version of the Oxford English dictionary  
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defines ‘modest’ as – ‘(of a woman) dressing or behaving so as to avoid impropriety or 
indecency, especially to avoid attracting sexual attention; (of clothing) not revealing or 
emphasizing a person's figure’. The idea of a woman’s modesty therefore is intimately 
connected to the ideas of ‘scrupulous chastity’, ‘womanly propriety of behaviour’, ‘decency’, 
etc. Therefore, outrage of a woman’s modesty actually means the outrage of her decency, 
chastity and sense of propriety. To reiterate the same point made before, offences as serious as 
PSV needs to be disconnected from patriarchal ideas of chastity and modesty of a woman as 
they are fundamentally opposed to our Constitutional ideas of individual rights and the equality 
of the sexes. PSV of all kinds are serious assaults on a woman’s person and her rights; and it 
needs to be perceived by law as such. Constructing PSV as an ‘outrage of modesty’ trivialises 
and misstates the harm. This Court agrees with the Petitioner that all kinds of PSV must be 
understood as an act of physical and sexual invasion aimed at harming, humiliating and 
degrading the victim. 
[39] Section 354 also stipulates a punishment that is far lesser than the one prescribed by the 
rape provision (Section 376). In this Court’s view there is no justification in grading different 
kinds of PSV on a scale of gravity depending on the orifice of the body violated and the 
instrument of violation. All kinds of non-consensual sexual penetration of the female body are 
equally grave because they equally violate a woman’s right to sexual choice and her physical 
and sexual integrity. There may be different amounts of punishment awarded depending on the 
circumstances of each case, but not by definition on the combination of orifice and instrument 
of violation.  
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[40] Section 354 may be adequate to deal with sexual harassment or molestation. But it is 
certainly not adequate to deal with any kind of non-consensual sexual penetration of the 
female body. 
[41] The other provision that is used by the Respondents to prosecute cases of PSV is Section 
377 IPC. This provision criminalises sexual intercourse against the order of nature. The 
Respondents claim this to be an appropriate provision for the purpose, as PSV involving anal-
penile or oral-penile intercourse is ‘unnatural’ sex. This Court agrees that within the meaning of 
Section 377, such kinds of intercourse are deemed to be against the order of nature. But that 
does not make this an appropriate provision to deal with PSV. This provision criminalises 
intercourse, whether consensual or not, on the basis of its non-conformity to the generally 
accepted vaginal-penile norm. The section does not criminalise the act on the basis of absence 
or presence of consent and the consequent absence or presence of personal harm to one of the 
parties. It does not contemplate a ‘victim’ and a ‘perpetrator’. ‘Unnatural offences’ are crimes 
even in the absence of a harm or offence to a person because this particular provision seeks its 
moral legitimacy from the principle of ‘legal moralism’.  
*42+ Such a principle endeavours to punish immorality ‘that can be committed not only in 
publicly harmful and offensive ways, but also discreetly by consenting and hence unharmed 
parties, in private or before consenting (hence unharmed and unoffended) audiences’ (Joel 
Feinberg, Harmless Wrongdoing: Moral Limits of the Criminal Law, 1988, 3). Such actions are 
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condemned by society and law because they do not conform to a particular social conception 
of morality.  
[43] Non-consensual penetration of the female body involving whichever combination of acts 
needs to be criminalised due to the absence of the woman’s consent. She is the person who is 
harmed – her rights are infringed, her body is invaded, she is forced to become the object of 
another’s end. She is harmed because she has to act sexually without her own free consent. 
Section 377 does not recognise her personal harm because it criminalises the act irrespective of 
whether she consents or not. This can in no way be said to be an appropriate provision to deal 
with PSV of any kind. The fact that it carries equivalent punishment to the rape provision is no 
reason at all to call it appropriate. There are many other provisions in the IPC dealing with 
other offences that carry equivalent punishment to rape. But they cannot be used to prosecute 
sexual violence as they are not appropriate in content. It is the same with Section 377. It may 
stipulate similar punishment but it is not made for criminalising sexual violence. The Petitioner 
has correctly argued that the Respondents have misconstrued the legislative intent of Section 
377. 
[44] This Court finds enough reasons to conclude that neither Section 354 nor Section 377 IPC 
are adequate provisions for prosecuting any kind of PSV. They are inappropriate in content and 
form; and undermine and invalidate the victim’s personal harm through their language and 
construction. This Court also finds the Respondents responsible for trivialising PSV by equating 
it with voluntary unnatural sexual relations.  
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[45] The next question is whether the narrow interpretation of rape as only vaginal-penile 
penetration infringes the fundamental rights of women under Articles 14, 15(3) and 21 of the 
Constitution. Article 14 of the Constitution guarantees equal legal protection and equal 
treatment by the law to all persons within its jurisdiction irrespective of, among other 
attributes, their sex. The Petitioner argues that the non-inclusion of most kinds of PSV within 
the definition of rape under Section 375/376 IPC, leads to inadequate access to justice for 
victims of such violence and therefore infringes the right to equality under Article 14. This Court 
agrees that the provisions currently used to prosecute PSV other than vaginal-penile rapes are 
inadequate and inappropriate. Consequently victims of such violence are denied proper redress 
of their injury.  
*46+ Section 377 prescribes punishment of ‘imprisonment for life’ or ‘imprisonment for either 
description ... which may extend to ten years’. But the sentences actually awarded are rarely 
ever as grave as the stipulated punishment. In Chitranjan Dass 1975 CrLJ 30 (SC), where the 
crime under Section 377 was proved, the Supreme Court awarded a punishment of two months 
imprisonment. In Mihir v. State 1992 CrLJ 488 (Orissa), where unnatural offences were 
committed on a minor girl the accused was sentenced to two years imprisonment. Such 
sentences may be justified if the case is one of consensual unnatural sex between adults as was 
originally contemplated by the provision. But sexual violence against minors is being treated 
equally trivially under this section. When we compare these sentences with the sentences 
awarded under Section 375/376, the difference is huge. 
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[47] In T.K. Gopal @ Gopi v. State of Karnataka [2000] 4 LRI 1045, this Court upheld a High 
Court sentence of 10 years rigorous imprisonment for the vaginal-penile rape of a minor girl. In 
State of Rajasthan v. Om Prakash [2002] 2 LRI 297, this Court reinstated the sentence of seven 
years imprisonment awarded by the trial Court for the vaginal-penile rape of a minor girl and 
overturned the High Court’s judgment in favour of acquittal. So in similar types of offences (PSV 
against a child) the punishments vary hugely depending on whether the vagina has been 
violated by a penis or not. 
[48] This shows that vaginal-penile rapes are routinely treated as graver offences than other 
kinds of non-consensual sexual penetrations. This is so in spite of equivalent punishments 
prescribed in Sections 375 and 377 IPC. And this is made possible by the exclusion of other 
kinds of PSV from the definition of rape under Section 375 IPC.  
[49] The narrow definition of rape as only non-consensual vaginal-penile intercourse hampers 
access to justice for many scores of women who are victims of PSV of the other kinds. The 
unreasonable and unsustainable difference between vaginal-penile and other kinds of PSV 
constructed by the Respondents unfairly treats some victims of rape as not-as-harmed as other 
victims of rape and infringes their right to equality before the law. In this sense such a 
definition is indeed a violation of the right to equal treatment by the law under Article 14 of the 
Constitution. 
[50] All victims of PSV deserve equal treatment by the law and the equal recognition that their 
rights to physical integrity and sexual autonomy have been infringed. Grading of the suffering 
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caused by different kinds of PSV is both impossible and undesirable as suffering is subjective 
and contextual; how a particular person will experience a particular PSV is likely to be different 
from another person and the context may greatly affect the nature and degree of harm. It is 
not the law’s task to evaluate harms in terms of subjective experience. The law should look 
uniformly at legal injuries sustained in terms of rights and freedoms of an individual 
irrespective of a victim’s subjective experience. A victim who has recovered from the trauma of 
PSV in a relatively shorter time may have managed to suffer less than the victim who has 
suffered long term PTSD67 and resorted to suicide, but to law the harms must be the same. 
Construing the harm inflicted in terms of its effect on the victim runs the risk of leniency 
towards rapists whose victims have proved themselves psychologically stronger than those of 
other rapists. The successful struggle of a woman to overcome her trauma should not work as a 
gain for her attacker who gets a lesser sentence. The law risks getting into murky waters when 
it starts talking in terms of subjective suffering, as suffering is rarely quantifiable. For the sake 
of fairness, all rapists irrespective the effect on the victim must be punished similarly for the 
infringement they have caused to their victim’s legal and moral rights and entitlements. 
[51] Article 21 of the Constitution guarantees the right to life with human dignity to all persons 
within the territory of India. In Bodhisattwa Gautam v. Subhra Chakraborty AIR 1996 SC 922, 
this Court has declared that rape is indeed a violation of the right to life of a woman; it is the 
violation of her right to live with human dignity. The same has been affirmed by this Court in 
many other occasions including Chairman, Railway Board & Ors. v. Chandrima Das & Ors. 
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[2000] 2 LRI 273.  In Vishaka v. State of Rajasthan AIR 1997 SC 3011, this Court has also 
affirmed that sexual harassment in workplace is a violation of the right to life of a woman under 
Article 21 of the Constitution.  
[52] As said above, this Court does not find any justification to differentially treat vaginal-penile 
rapes from other kinds of PSV. The Respondents’ contention and the Law Commission’s opinion 
that such a distinction is ‘natural’ is not one for which there is concrete, demonstrable support. 
Therefore all kinds of PSV (and keeping in mind the judgment of this Court in Vishaka, indeed all 
kinds of sexual violence, penetrative or not) must be seen as violations of the right of the victim 
to live a life with human dignity. Being compelled to have sexual intercourse without one’s 
consent is a traumatic experience; it is a violation of the basic bodily and sexual integrity of a 
person; it more often than not leaves deep psychological and often physical scars that interfere 
with a victim’s life for a long time afterwards.  
[53] Sexual violations of all kinds, especially those involving the invasion of intimate/internal 
parts of a woman’s body are equal infringements of her fundamental right to live a life with 
human dignity. A life blighted by memories of sexual violation is an injured life. A woman 
subjected to such violence is injured in her entitlement to live a life of dignity and freedom. The 
Respondents’ decision to exclude PSV other than vaginal-penile rape from the definition of rape 
under Section 375 IPC did violate the rights of the victims of such violence to live with human 
dignity. The narrow definition of rape favoured by the Respondents foreclosed the possibility of 
adequate redress of their harms for innumerable women. The decision to prosecute other kinds 
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of coercive sexual penetrations under Section 377 IPC which do not recognise a victim at all is 
an outright invalidation of the harm of the affected woman. Therefore the Respondents have 
indeed through their narrow interpretation of the term ‘sexual intercourse’ in Section 375 IPC 
violated the fundamental right to life with human dignity of victims of other kinds of PSV under 
Article 21 of the Constitution. 
[54] The Petitioner has also argued that the narrow definition of rape contravenes Article 15(3) 
of the Constitution by defeating the purpose of the Criminal Law Amendment Act 1983 which 
inserts sub-section (2)(f) in Section 376 IPC. Article 15(3) of the Constitution gives the State 
powers to make ‘special provisions for women and children’ without violating the right to 
equality. The Criminal Law Amendment Act 1983 has amended the original rape law to make 
provision for aggravated punishment for certain kinds of rapes, including the rape of a woman 
below 12 years of age. The Petitioner contends that the narrow definition of rape has precluded 
women below 12 years from taking advantage of this amendment when they have suffered PSV 
of other kinds. 
[55] This Court agrees that the amendment in question was indeed made under the powers 
conferred on the state under Article 15(3) of the Constitution. This Court also agrees that PSV 
victims below 12 years have not been able to access this special provision if they did not fit the 
category of victims of vaginal-penile rape. Though it cannot be said that the narrow 
interpretation of rape by the Respondents directly contravenes Article 15(3) of the 
Constitution, yet by blocking access to the special provisions for children enacted under the 
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powers conferred by the article, the interpretation used by the Respondents has effectively 
defeated the purpose of the Constitutional provision.  
[56] The status of international law in relation to municipal law in India is also under contention 
in the current case. The Petitioner has put reliance on a number of international legal 
provisions to support the petition. The first among them is the Respondent’s obligations under 
the U.N. treaties of CRC and CEDAW. India has ratified both of the Conventions. The Petitioner 
argues that the Union of India (Respondent No. 1) has an obligation under Article 19 of the CRC 
which enjoins the state party to ‘take all appropriate legislative, administrative, social and 
educational measures to protect the child from all forms of physical and mental violence, injury 
or abuse, neglect or negligent treatment maltreatment or exploitation including sexual abuse…’ 
Under Article 4 of CEDAW, India has the obligation ‘to take in all fields, in particular in the 
political, social, economic and cultural fields, all appropriate measures, including legislation, to 
ensure the full development and advancement of women, for the purpose of guaranteeing 
them the exercise and enjoyment of human rights and fundamental freedoms on a basis of 
equality with men.’ Sexual violence itself is a form of socio-cultural discrimination against 
women. Disproportionately more women are victims of sexual violence perpetrated by men 
than vice versa. India has an obligation under CEDAW to take legislative measures to minimise 
this discrimination. And that includes making appropriate laws to deal with PSV of all kinds. 
Under-regulation of sexual violence, especially male sexual violence against women, makes law 
and the State complicit in this discrimination.  
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[57] The question here is whether the international obligations of the Union of India 
(Respondent No. 1) can be directly taken into consideration by this Court in the absence of 
domestic implementation of the obligations through appropriate legislation.  
[58] In Madhu Kishwar & Ors. v. State of Bihar & Ors. (1996) 5 SCC 125, this Court held that the 
State was under an obligation to enforce the provisions of the CEDAW which provided that 
discrimination against women violated the principles of equality of rights and respect for 
human dignity. 
[59] In Vishaka & Ors. v. State of Rajasthan & Ors. (1997) 6 SCC 241, this Court referred to the 
Statement of Principles of the Independence of the Judiciary in the LAWASIA region accepted at 
Beijing in 1995 by the Chief Justices of the countries in the Asia-Pacific. The principles accepted 
are those that represent the minimum observable standards to maintain the independence and 
effective functioning of the judiciary. Some of the stated objectives in the Beijing Statement 
are: ‘(a) to ensure that all persons are able to live securely under the Rule of Law; (b) to 
promote, within the proper limits of the judicial function, the observance and the attainment of 
human rights; and (c) to administer the law impartially among persons and between persons 
and the State.’ In light of the above, the Court in Vishaka decided, specifically in reference to 
Articles 11 and 24 of CEDAW, that ‘There is no reason why these international conventions and 
norms cannot, therefore, be used for construing the fundamental rights expressly guaranteed 
in the Constitution of India which embody the basic concept of gender equality in all spheres of 
human activity.’ 
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[60] In Municipal Corporation of Delhi v. Female Workers (Muster Roll) & Anr. 2000 (2) SCR 171, 
this Court referred to India’s obligation under Article 11 of CEDAW and declared –‘These 
principles which are contained in Article 11… have to be read into the contract of service 
between Municipal Corporation of Delhi and the women employees (muster roll); and so read 
these employees immediately become entitled to all the benefits conceived under the 
Maternity Benefit Act, 1961.’ 
[61] In Githa Hariharan v. Reserve Bank of India (1999) 2 SCC 228, this Court relied upon 
CEDAW and the Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action 1995 which urges state parties to 
take appropriate measures to prevent discrimination against women. It was held by the Court 
that the domestic courts are under an obligation to give due regard to international 
conventions and norms while construing domestic laws when there is no inconsistency 
between them. 
[62] It is clear from the above examples that this Court has on various occasions decided in 
favour of taking India’s international legal commitments into account while deciding domestic 
disputes. The Respondents have argued that this Court in Vishaka decided in favour of judicial 
implementation of international obligations, ‘but only in absence of municipal laws’. As 
Sections 377 and 354 are not appropriate for prosecuting PSV, and rape under Section 375 IPC 
is currently interpreted as only vaginal-penile rape, this Court holds that there are no municipal 
laws to deal with other kinds of PSV.  Therefore this Court is perfectly within its powers to 
implement international law while deciding this case.  
Madhumanti Mukherjee  Judging in the Presence of Women as Legal Persons 
_____________________________________________________________________________________ 
_____________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
58 
 
*63+ The Respondents have also alleged that the implementation of international treaties is ‘in 
the realm of State policy and are, therefore, not enforceable in a Court of law’. This Court has 
not in the past entirely agreed with this line of reasoning as is evident from the above-
mentioned cases. International legal obligations, especially the ones safe-guarding human 
rights, should always be a part of judicial consideration in every relevant case because the 
Constitution very clearly intends to confer a wide variety of inalienable and judicially 
enforceable rights to the people. The Indian judiciary cannot close its eyes to the intention of 
the Constitution as expressed in the Fundamental Rights and Directives of State Policy. A 
decade after India’s ratification of the CEDAW (on 9th July 1993) and accession to the CRC (on 
11th December 1992) there is no appropriate criminal legal provision to deal with most types of 
PSV. If the Legislature does not pay heed to its obligations under international law, the Judiciary 
cannot simply fold its hands and not take account of the obligations while deciding cases. The 
legitimate expectation created by Respondent No. 1 through its ratification of the international 
human rights treaties must be honoured by the Respondent itself and its agents including the 
other Respondents. Lastly, because the Respondents have already ratified the treaties in 
question, it can also be reasonably expected that if this Court takes the treaty obligation into 
consideration it will not be against the intention of the Respondent. 
*64+ The Respondents have contended that ‘foreign laws’ do not bind the Indian domestic 
courts including this Court. The ‘foreign laws’ that the Petitioner has placed reliance on are 
some UK and South African domestic court judgments. It is true that no Indian Court is bound 
by the precedents of Courts of other jurisdictions. But because of the shared English common 
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law origins of the Indian, US, UK, South African, Canadian and Australian legal systems, 
judgments from any of these jurisdictions has always been considered by the Indian Courts. It is 
nothing new. Nor is it unreasonable or undesirable. 
[65] The Respondents have also submitted that reliance cannot be placed by this Court on the 
definition of rape devised by the ICTY because Indian Courts are not bound by International 
judicial decisions. Again this Court agrees that it is not bound by the pronouncements of ICTY. 
But in the absence of any other definition of rape in international law, the definition devised by 
ICTY is a sound guideline for an internationally aware domestic judiciary.   
[66] The next question is whether this Court has the necessary powers to broaden the 
definition of rape contained in Section 375 IPC. Under Article 13 along with Article 32 of the 
Constitution of India, this Court has not only the power but also the responsibility of judicial 
review of existing laws to determine whether they conform to the fundamental rights of the 
people of India. If a particular law or its existing interpretation infringes any of the fundamental 
rights provisions, this Court has the responsibility to re-interpret the law to bring it in line with 
the Constitutional rights or if not possible, to declare the law void.   
[67] A related question is the concern for legal uncertainty arising from over-zealous judicial 
review. Generally it must be conceded that for the sake of preserving legal certainty it is not 
advisable for the judiciary to change statutory definitions against the letter and intention of the 
legislative process. It may make statutory provisions confusing, ambiguous and against the 
wishes of a democratically elected legislature if the Courts start amending the provisions at will 
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without due process in the parliament. But this is true only until the existing legislation does 
not result in infringement of the Constitutional framework. The purpose of the powers of 
judicial review is to circumscribe the power of the parliament to override the Constitution; and 
the judiciary, as guardians of the Constitution, must be mindful of this duty. 
[68] Moreover in the present case, the broadening of the definition of rape by judicial 
intervention cannot be said to go against the legislative intent. The meaning of rape as vaginal-
penile intercourse is not evident from the provision itself. The actual words in the IPC are – ‘A 
man is said to commit “rape” who… has sexual intercourse with a woman …’ The term ‘sexual 
intercourse’ has not been defined as vaginal-penile anywhere in the statute. The only additional 
information about the term is in the Explanation contained in the provision which says – 
‘Penetration is sufficient to constitute the sexual intercourse necessary *for+ the offence of 
rape’. Here too the law does not expressly define penetration as vaginal-penile penetration. In 
other words a plain reading of Section 375 IPC does not make it clear that the legislature 
intended the definition of rape to be interpreted as vaginal-penile.  
[69] The Petitioner has correctly submitted that this ambiguity in the meanings of the terms 
‘sexual intercourse’ and ‘penetration’ in the statute affords an appropriate opportunity for 
judicial intervention. This Court can rightfully define any term in any statute that has been left 
undefined by the legislature. This is not only possible but also desirable for the smoother 
delivery of justice. Undefined and ambiguous terms make the law amenable to misuse. 
Especially in this particular case, the ambiguity in the definition of rape has made it possible for 
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the Respondents to give it an interpretation that contravenes Constitutional guarantees of 
rights. Judicial re-interpretation of the law will bring it in line with the Constitution of India. 
Surely this cannot be detrimental to the ends of justice. 
[70] The Petitioner has also asked the Court to give a purposive interpretation to the term 
‘rape’ in Section 375 keeping in mind the rise of cases of sexual abuse of children involving PSV 
other than vaginal-penile rape. The recent rise in reported sexual violence against children is 
likely to be a fact. But that must not be taken to prove that actual incidence rates have 
increased. If the rate of a particular offence varies over time, there must be an explanation for 
that. No evidence has been submitted by the Petitioner to prove this claim and the Court finds 
no reason to assume without evidence that increase in reported cases directly reflects increase 
in incidence.  
*71+ The more feasible fact is that society’s awareness about the phenomenon has increased in 
recent times. Moving towards a more liberal outlook, we as a society have come to respect 
individual rights over and above community interests; have become more intolerant of inter-
personal abuses of power in different contexts. As our society changes to a progressively 
capitalist one causing the traditional joint families and closed communities to break up and 
form migrated mixed population communities consisting of nuclear families with less children 
and working parents, the power relations change within the family and society, giving the 
powerless a voice to protest and the public a glimpse within the privacy of extended families 
and communities where child abuse thrives and grows. Our society is still very reserved in 
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disturbing the patriarchal status quo or in interfering within what is known as the privacy of the 
family but we are slowly starting to pull out the phantoms from the closet and face the facts. In 
all probability this is the reason for the increased reporting rate of child abuse. 
[72] Sexual abuse of children is likely to have been always present in Indian society as in other 
societies elsewhere and is not something that has suddenly come into being. The claim that 
child sexual abuse is a new phenomenon is mistaken. In the words of distinguished historian, 
Sheila Rowbotham – 
‘This mistaken belief arises because we can only grasp silence in the moment in which it is 
breaking. The sound of silence breaking makes us understand what we could not hear 
before. But the fact that we could not hear does not prove that no pain existed.’ (Sheila 
Rowbotham, Woman’s Consciousness, Man’s World, 1973, 29-30) 
[73] Therefore this Court does not accept the argument that something fundamentally has 
changed in the Indian society resulting in hugely raised incidences of sexual abuse of children. 
What the Court does accept is that there is a changed scenario of increased reporting in child 
sexual abuse cases. This must lead the legal establishment to devise better laws to deal with 
child abuse. But in the present case, the reasoning in favour of widening the definition of rape 
in Section 375 IPC is more general and fundamental.  
[74] The Petitioner has conflated the issue of the need for adequate laws to address the abuse 
of children with the problem of arbitrary categorisation of different kinds of rapes stemming 
from the legal non-recognition of the personal harms of raped women. This conflation is both 
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unfortunate and misleading. Even if the rape law is made wider in its import by judicial 
interpretation, it will not fill the legal void regarding sexual abuse of children, firstly because 
sexual abuse of children can occur even without any kind of sexual penetration, and secondly 
because abuse of male children, even the penetrative kind, will not be covered by the widened 
rape law. Any law of sexual abuse of children needs to take into account that such abuse is not 
always straightforward PSV, that there are complex and myriad ways, aggravated by the child’s 
young age and inexperience, in which she/he can be manipulated into participation in physically 
and psychologically damaging sexual acts. Therefore the argument that the definition of rape 
needs to be broadened in order to respond to the phenomenon of child abuse is ill-conceived 
and fallacious. As mentioned before, the rape law should recognise all kinds of PSVs as rapes 
due to a more fundamental need to shift the understanding of rape from violation of chastity to 
violation of the person and her fundamental rights. The broadened version of the rape law will 
redress sexual abuse of girl-children only to the extent such abuse involves PSV of any kind. And 
of course, in cases of children as opposed to adult women, presence of consent is no defence 
for the perpetrator. 
[75] It has again been contended by the Respondents that broadening the definition of rape by 
a judicial writ would be against the rule of stare decisis. The rule of stare decisis directs the 
Courts to adhere to previous decisions of courts of equal or higher standing within the same 
jurisdiction for the sake of legal consistency. But it is not a rule without exceptions. The need to 
maintain consistency in the law cannot outweigh the need to correct unjust laws. If a previous 
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decision of the Court is found to have perpetrated grievous wrong and injustice, it becomes 
essential to diverge from the decision to correct that wrong as soon as possible. 
[76] This Court, in Karnal Improvement Trust, Karnal v. Smt. Parkash Wanti (Dead) & Anr. 1995 
(1) Suppl. SCR 136, referred to a series of authorities from the Indian and other common law 
jurisdictions about the limits of the doctrine of stare decisis and decided – 
‘...that normally the decisions which have been followed for a long period of time and 
have been acted upon by persons in the formulation of contracts or in the disposition of 
that property or other legal processes should generally be followed afterwards but this 
rule is not inexorable, inflexible and universally applicable in all situations. The appellate 
court will not shirk from overruling the decision or series of decisions which establish a 
ratio plainly outside the statute or in negation of the object resulting in defeating the 
purpose of the statute or when the Court is convinced that the view is clearly erroneous 
or illegal. Perpetration of such an illegal decision would result in grievous wrong.’  
[77] In State of Maharashtra v. Milind & Ors. AIR 2001 SC 393, this Court observed that – 
‘The rule of stare decisis is not inflexible so as to preclude a departure therefrom in any case 
but its application depends on facts and circumstances of each case. It is good to proceed 
from precedent to precedent but it is earlier the better to give quietus to the incorrect one 
by annulling it to avoid repetition or perpetuation of injustice, hardship and anything ex-
facie illegal more particularly when a precedent runs counter to the provisions of the 
constitution.’ 
[78] The Respondents have specifically mentioned the particular decision in State of Punjab v. 
Major Singh 1966 (Supp) SCR 266 where it was held that the rupturing of the hymen by 
insertion of a finger is not rape. In the view of this Court today, this previous decision 
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perpetrates a grievous wrong by unreasonably differentiating between vaginal-penile rapes and 
other kinds of penetrative sexual violence. As said before, this difference is based on an 
understanding of rape as an offence against a woman’s chastity. This decision cannot be 
adhered to in light of the current understanding of rape as an offence against the person of a 
woman. This and all other decisions of this Court that have interpreted rape as vaginal-penile 
must be departed from as they infringe the fundamental rights of the victims of PSV. 
[79] Stare decisis literally means ‘to stand by what has been decided’. But no Court shall be 
justified in standing by what it believes to have been decided wrongly. The judiciary’s first 
commitment is not to rules of conduct, but to the purpose of delivering justice. The rules are 
simply a way to the purpose, and not the purpose itself.  
[80] An issue not covered by the Petition but relevant to it, is the legal redress for rape of men. 
The law in India provides no redress whatsoever for male rape. It is beyond the scope of this 
judgment to remedy this shortfall. The Respondents prosecute such cases under Section 377 
IPC which as noted earlier, does not construct the crime in terms of non-consent. Section 377 
IPC criminalises voluntary sexual relations that do not conform to the socially accepted 
heterosexual norm; it does not contemplate a victim and a perpetrator. Therefore it actively 
invalidates the harm inflicted on the victim in PSV. Male victims of PSV are inadequately dealt 
with under this section. In Charanjit Singh 1986 CrLJ 173 (Punjab & Haryana), where a truck-
driver was prosecuted for committing sodomy on a boy, a lower court sentenced him to one-
year imprisonment and a fine of 500 rupees. It is not possible judicially to broaden the 
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definition of rape under Section 375 IPC to bring men under its purview due to the specific 
wording to the contrary. Instead this Court would like to take the opportunity to urge the 
legislature to immediately contemplate an amendment of the existing law of sexual violence to 
bring men under its ambit as victims.  
[81] To summarise the decision of this Court – 
 
a. The definition of rape under Section 375 IPC should include all kinds of PSV, namely – 
anal-penile, oral-penile, vaginal-penile, anal-object, vaginal-object, vaginal-finger and 
anal-finger. PSV must be uniformly termed rape and must be understood in terms of 
violation of the victim’s rights to physical and sexual integrity and autonomy/choice. No 
gradation of PSV into lesser and graver is warranted by the law. 
b. The current narrow interpretation of rape in Section 375 IPC as vaginal-penile rape is 
against the fundamental rights of the victims of PSV under Articles 14, 15(3) and 21 of 
the Constitution. 
c. The Court is within the bounds of its constitutional powers and responsibilities in re-
interpreting an ambiguous statutory term whose current interpretation infringes the 
Constitution. 
d. The doctrine of stare decisis is not so rigid as to prevent a Court from departing from its 
previous decisions under all circumstances. Where following a precedent can result in 
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perpetuating a grievous wrong or a contravention of Constitutional rights, the rule of 
stare decisis must be abandoned. 
e. India’s obligation to ratified international human rights treaties must be kept in mind by 
the Courts, especially when an unreasonably long time has passed and the legislature 
has not acted to incorporate the provisions of the treaties in municipal law. 
f. Judicial pronouncements by international courts and tribunals are not binding on Indian 
courts, but may appropriately act as guidelines for domestic courts for understanding 
various evolving international legal concepts.  
g. Similarly, decisions made in other common law jurisdictions do not act as precedents in 
Indian domestic judicial decision-making but they may be used as guidelines by Indian 
Courts. 
h. Victims of male rape are unjustifiably left with no proper legal redress in Indian criminal 
law. This Court asks the Indian Legislature to pay urgent attention to this serious and 
regrettable situation. 
 
For the reasons mentioned before, this Special Leave Petition is allowed. 
 
Order: 
Order accordingly. 
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Conclusion 
I will conclude with a speculation of what effects such a judgment would have had if the 
Supreme Court of India had written it in 2004. Firstly, the law of rape in the Indian Penal Code 
1860 would have redressed all forms of PSV against women for the last seven years which 
would have saved many women and female children from inadequate redress of their harms. 
Secondly, the legal idea of rape as violation of chastity, often reiterated by judicial 
pronouncements in India68 would have started shifting towards an understanding of rape as a 
violation of personal space and constitutional rights of an individual.69 As the editors of the 
Feminist Judgments Project in the UK write –  
‘…law is not simply a coercive force, but is also a powerful and productive social discourse 
which creates and reinforces gender norms. … By  intervening in law from a feminist 
perspective, one of the aims of the Feminist Judgments Project was to disrupt this process 
of gender construction, and to introduce different accounts of gender that might be less 
limiting for women.’70  
Consequently, if this judgment was written by the Court in 2004, it would have been a powerful 
intervention into and disruption of the existing patriarchal understandings of rape in India. 
Thirdly, the idea that some kinds of rape can be legitimately prosecuted under the law of 
unnatural intercourse which does not depend on presence or absence of consent, and 
consequently that some kinds of intercourse might be branded unnatural, would not have 
                                                          
68
 The Indian courts often define rape in terms of violation of supreme honour and chastity of a woman as I have 
discussed above. 
69
 There are instances when rape has been judicially recognised as a violation of constitutional rights, yet that 
sounds like lip-service as long as the division between rapes and non-rape PSVs stand, and as long as the judiciary 
keep on describing rape as violation of a woman’s chastity, because both cannot be true at the same time.  
70
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found support in the highest court of the country. And finally, the amalgamation of the issue of 
protection of the girl-child with the quite different issue of upholding the constitutional rights 
of the woman would have been discouraged.71  
Reiterating what has been said earlier, this judgment is being presented as one of the 
many feminist judgments possible in this particular case. The strength of feminism lies not in its 
uniformity but in its multiplicity and unevenness, in its internal conflicts and accommodations, 
and in its ability to stretch and encompass myriad voices without permanently privileging some 
of them over the others. This dynamism is a sign of feminism’s vitality and potential. And I will 
be glad if my humble contribution to the enormous possibility of feminist judgments can spur 
others into writing their own feminist versions of the same judgment. I am immensely 
fortunate to have come across such a potent tool of feminist scholarship in the feminist 
judgment projects of Canada and the UK, and feel privileged to be able to add my voice to this 
movement. 
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